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Definitions of Intent for AI Derived From Common Law

EasyChair Preprint no. 4422

14 pagesDate: October 17, 2020


The concept of intent is left undefined by the judiciary for jurors to decide. This poses a problem when considering intent in AI. There exist laws which are defined by intent, crimes which are intent specific (notably murder) and inchoate offences (intent to do x offences) which rely on establishing intent. As Autonomous Algorithmic agents (A-bots) grow in complexity, they will behave in ways deemed illegal if repeated by humans. AI designers must ensure that their A-bots do not intend to break the law. Equally prosecutors must develop tests to test intent in A-bots, both to establish whether they inherit intent for their owners or in the case when AI-personhood exists, whether the A-bot has the required mens-rea.

Keyphrases: AI, autonomous agents, causal reasoning, Intent, legal reasoning, mens rea, Reinforcement Learning

BibTeX entry
BibTeX does not have the right entry for preprints. This is a hack for producing the correct reference:
  author = {Hal Ashton},
  title = {Definitions of Intent for AI Derived From Common Law},
  howpublished = {EasyChair Preprint no. 4422},

  year = {EasyChair, 2020}}
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