Incorporating Matching Mechanisms into Market Design for Rehabilitation Reservation System

EasyChair Preprint no. 8654

Abstract

This study aims to design a matching mechanism to improve the utilization rate of rehabilitation bus and to facilitate the reservation processes of passengers. The existing operation mode of rehabilitation bus in Taiwan is divided into two types: partial government subsidy and full self-payment. The partial government subsidy type is operated by local government agencies or entrusted agencies. Users need to make an appointment by phone or register online in advance; however, limited transportation capacity and excess demand requests during the peak time slots overwhelmed the entire reservation system. The proposed model is similar as the Boston mechanism, which is called priority matching in market design. The deferred acceptance algorithm used in this study is a two-sided matching mechanism. From the perspective of the demander, passengers can choose the preferred order of boarding schedules at the time of the consultation, while the service vehicles are dispatched based on the passenger's disability level as the priority.

Keyphrases: Deferred acceptance algorithm, market design, preference, Rehabilitation bus, two-sided matching

@Booklet{EasyChair:8654,
  author = {Lan Chen Yu and Chu Chih-Peng and Chen Cheng-Chieh},
  title = {Incorporating Matching Mechanisms into Market Design for Rehabilitation  Reservation System},
  howpublished = {EasyChair Preprint no. 8654},

  year = {EasyChair, 2022}}