



Citizen Judgment of Misbehaving in City Hall:
Experimental Evidence of the Role of
Demographic Factors and Behavioral Intentions

Casey Fleming and Candice Bodkin

EasyChair preprints are intended for rapid dissemination of research results and are integrated with the rest of EasyChair.

June 10, 2019

Citizen Judgment of Misbehaving in City Hall: Experimental Evidence of the Roles of Demographic Factors and Behavioral Intentions

Casey J. Fleming¹ and Candice P. Bodkin²

Draft prepared for delivery at the Public Management Research Conference
June 11-15, 2019
Chapel Hill, North Carolina

¹Department of Political Science, East Carolina University
A-134 Brewster Bldg, Mail Stop 564, Greenville, NC 27858-4353
flemingca17@ecu.edu

²Department of Public and Nonprofit Studies, Georgia Southern University
P.O. Box 8048, Statesboro, GA 30460-8048
cbodkin@georgiasouthern.edu

Introduction

Social equity research provides evidence of inequities at all levels of government and within diverse policy domains ranging from education to healthcare to public transportation and the environment (Guy and McCandless 2012; Gooden 2017). Similarly, the human resource management literature finds disparities in the workplace, such as those related to unequal pay or assessment of performance resulting from biases and stereotypes of age (Posthuma and Campion 2009; Ng and Feldman 2012; Abrams, Swift, and Drury 2016); gender (Hale 1999; Alkadry and Tower 2011; Meier and Wilkins 2002); and race (Wilson 2006; Ortega, Plagens, Stephens, and Berry-James 2012; Riccucci and Saldivar 2014). Citing the theoretical and practical limitations of viewing these factors in isolation, Bearfield (2009), Stivers (2002), and others advocate for social equity research that accommodates intersectionality (Crenshaw 1994) and the reality of simultaneous membership in multiple identity categories. This perspective is consistent with recent public administration studies of the interaction effects of race and gender on disparities in work assignments (Christensen, Szmer, and Stritch 2012), government contracting with minority- and women-owned firms (Fernandez, Malatesta, and Smith 2013), and use of legal authority (Portillo 2008). Elsewhere, research finds significant main effects of gender (Johnson, Murphy, Zewdie, and Reichard 2008; Rink, Ryan, and Stoker 2013) and gender-age interaction effects (Clapham, Johnson, and Ambrose 2016) on ratings of leaders and managers.

This paper extends the intersectionality conversation into representative bureaucracy, ethics, and public opinion research, exploring the effects of particular gender-race-age profiles of unelected government officials on citizens' judgments of such actors and their misbehavior. Unethical behavior and corruption of public officials is costly to governments and their agencies in terms of diminished public trust, economic development, and performance (Caillier 2010;

Meon and Sekkat 2005; Mo 2001; Melgar, Rossi, and Smith 2010; Park and Blenkinsopp 2011; Hijal-Moghrabi, Sabharwal, and Berman 2015). Studies across diverse fields, particularly political science, public policy, and economics, have investigated the effects of government corruption involving elected officials on citizens in a variety of contexts, with findings indicating that, for instance, levels of societal grand corruption can affect the ways in which citizens react to political corruption, gender can shape individual-level tolerance for unethical behavior, and in-group loyalty can sustain citizens' willingness to continue to support unethical politicians (Bauhr and Charron 2018; Alatas, Cameron, Chaudhuri, Erkal, and Gangadharan 2009; Swamy, Knack, Lee, and Azfar 2001; Reiss and Mitra 1998; Glover, Bumpus, Logan, and Ciesla 1997; Solaz, De Vries, and de Geus 2019). However, less attention has been explicitly turned toward unpacking citizen reactions to the unethical or corrupt behavior of bureaucrats, particularly to examine the factors influencing the nature of such judgments.

This paper's exploratory research questions ask: Are citizen judgments of city managers accused of breaking formal procedural rules driven by gender, age, and race or a confluence of these factors? Are patterns of citizen judgment of rule breaking city managers of specific gender-race-age profiles similar for violations driven by prosocial versus self-interested motives? And, do similar patterns among demographic factors emerge with citizen judgment of city managers accused of corruption? The authors use a pair of survey experiments to address these questions, an increasingly common approach in the public management literature and one with a lengthy history in applied public opinion research (Jilke and Van Ryzin 2017). The first experiment tests for main and interaction effects of gender, race, age, and rule violation intentions on the severity of citizens' recommendations for administrative disciplinary penalties to be taken against city managers reported to have skirted formal procedures, while the second experiment similar

explores the effects of gender, race, and age on citizens' intensity of moral outrage expressed in judgment of city managers accused of corruption in office.

This paper begins with a review of the key issues and relevant research of stereotypes, implicit biases, and symbolic representation. The next two sections detail the experimental designs and results of two studies. The final section offers general discussion and concluding remarks.

Background

The human brain is a subpar processing system. We are incapable of making use of all the information that is available to us in any given moment, which requires us to rely on shortcuts to make sense of what is important and determine how to classify and store incoming information. Stereotypes help us make assessments quickly about a situation to determine danger (e.g., lions will eat me, but house cats will not), and choose an appropriate course of action. Over time, we tend to remember instances that conform to stereotypes and ignore those that do not, which leads to the create of implicit biases.

It can be challenging to understand the full influence of implicit biases on individual-level decision making due to their hidden nature. Implicit biases are often unconscious attitudes or stereotypes that attribute specific character traits or personalities to particular groups (e.g., women, African Americans, Muslims). Implicit biases are particularly problematic because individuals are rarely aware of them and can use reasoning to dismiss concerns that their decision was based in prejudice. For example, the principle of merit in personnel decisions can hide the pervasiveness of biases that continue to disadvantage women and people of color in reaching the highest levels of management (Foley and Williamson 2018). This study examines

the way in which implicit biases about gender, race, and age may influence perceptions of wrongdoing on the part of city managers.

Despite the increase in women in the workforce and in elected positions, women still encounter and combat gender stereotypes. Research shows that gender stereotypes can reduce perceptions of women's leadership potential. Traditional gender norms associated with women, such as being more compassionate, emotional, and trustworthy, are viewed as less important than those associated with men, such as assertiveness and general competence (Eagly, Makhijani, and Klonsky 1992). In addition, effective leadership attributes are associated more closely with traditionally masculine traits than feminine traits. When women exhibit traditionally masculine traits in leadership they are often interpreted differently than when displayed by men (e.g. assertive women are "bossy"). Further, a recent study of CEOs finds that women chief executives are more likely to be dismissed regardless of firm performance (Gupta, Mortal, Silveri, Sun, and Turban 2018). Therefore, we may expect that women would be judged more harshly for failure than men.

Implicit biases related to race lead to unequal outcomes across a range of public services, including healthcare, policing, and education. Race and racism have a long and ugly past in the U. S., and stereotypes about non-whites persist despite efforts to curb explicit racist attitudes across all aspects of public life. The Black Lives Matter movement developed to confront the systemic racism in the criminal justice system, including racial profiling, police brutality, and unequal sentencing between black and white offenders. We might expect that black managers would be judged more harshly for rule breaking and corruption than their white counterparts.

Stereotypes and biases about generational groups abound. Popular news media outlets often report on stories about "millennials" and "boomers" as if these are groups with

homogenous, consistent, and clearly defined preferences. Even the typical human resource textbook makes generalities around generational groups (e.g., millennials are self-absorbed and entitled, baby-boomers are resistant to change and unwilling to try new things). Citizens may perceive actions differently if perpetrated by individuals in different age cohorts. Implicit biases and stereotypes related to gender, race and age may all play a role in how citizens view the actions of bureaucrats.

In addition to implicit biases, social identity theory may help in our understanding of how individuals interpret the actions of others. Tajfel (1979) argues that individuals create identity through belonging in various groups. Those who share group membership with us (e.g. gender, race, age, alma mater, political party, etc.) we feel a sense of pride and belonging to our group (the in-group) at the expense of others (the out-group). Individuals can belong to more than one group at a time and juggle membership in multiple groups simultaneously. This suggests that individuals may be more likely to overlook the bad behavior of others if they share a group membership.

In the fifty years since Minnowbrook, public administration scholars have created a substantial body of literature to support the theory of representative bureaucracy (e.g., Meier 1975; Keiser, Wilkins, Meier, and Holland 2002; Grissom, Nicholson-Crotty, and Nicholson-Crotty 2009). Representative bureaucracy is generally operate using three mechanisms; passive, active, and symbolic. Representative bureaucracy posits that when the demographics of the bureaucracy more closely mirrors the demographics of the community, they will better serve community needs of and further the principles of democracy (Rourke 1978). More recent scholarship focuses on symbolic representation (Ricucci, Van Ryzin, and Lavina 2014). Symbolic representation occurs when the presence of bureaucrats of different demographic

groups results in citizens to perceiving the actions or performance of those bureaucrats more positively, regardless of actual performance.

Study 1: Citizen Judgment of Rule Breaking in City Hall

The first study examines a situational or contingent factor in addition to – but distinct from – those characteristics representing shared identity groups and dynamics, such as sociodemographic attributes. Specifically, the study employs an experiment to test whether the nature of citizen reactions to public officials accused of policy violations is affected by the underlying motivations driving such noncompliance, and whether this dynamic is consistent across various age-race-gender demographic profiles of the focal government leaders. More specifically, the experiment compares the effects of prosocial rule breaking – violations carried out with the primary intention of benefiting the agency or its stakeholders (Morrison 2006) – and destructive or self-interested rule breaking, the more traditional notion of deviance spurred by malevolence, opportunism, and utility maximization. Beyond the influences of shared group memberships based on age, race, and gender – which can lead to in-group loyalty (Solaz et al. 2019) in political contexts – and stereotypes around demographic attributes, this study also examines city managers' rule violation motives as a situational factor that may shape the severity of hypothetical punishments levied by citizens against the accused. This approach to unpacking the nature of the focal event or behavior itself is similar to Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2016), who analyzed differences in citizen punishment of mayors directly involved in corruption and mayors indirectly responsible for corruption committed by those within their administrations.

Procedure and Sample


This study uses a between-subject survey experiment to explore the effects of particular demographic profiles and behavioral intentions on citizens' judgment of rule breaking city managers. Following a brief introduction to the survey and answering a short set of questions related to trust in and satisfaction with local government, participants were randomly assigned to one of 18 conditions, all of which will be discussed in detail shortly. Participants were then asked to recommend a level of disciplinary action for the city manager based on their assessments of a fictive news story before providing their own socio-demographic attributes.

Participants were randomly assigned to one of 18 possible groups (see Figure 1), including 16 treatment groups and two control groups. Participants in all groups were presented with and asked to read a fictional newspaper article¹ that details the story of a city manager accused of breaking procedural rules and working around the city council to approve a zoning exemption for a new real estate sale and development in the city's downtown. The experimental treatment or manipulation lies in the violation motives (see Appendix A) and the age, race, and gender of the city manager, which was communicated via photographs embedded within the news story and stated details (i.e. name, specific age). In half the groups, the 324-word article described the city manager's behavior in a positive light, in that he or she violated council rules to eliminate a downtown "eyesore" and to act in the "best interest of the city and its residents." In the other half of groups, the 340-word article casts the city manager's behavior in a negative light, suggesting that a strong conflict of interest and nepotism likely motivated the rule breaking. A photograph of the accused city manager accompanied the news story for 16 groups

¹ The story was adapted from Scavo (2008), a case study based on actual events.

that presented a particular demographic profile of age (younger, 34, or older, 62)², race (black or white), and gender (male or female, “John Williams” or “Patricia Williams”). In two control groups, a photograph was not included in the news story and details of age and first name were also omitted in order to present a focal actor free of demographic attributes of interest. Following the experimental news story block, the survey asks participants to evaluate the city manager’s rule breaking behavior by indicating the appropriate severity of punishment the city council should levy against the city manager.

Figure 1. Experimental design



² A pilot study was conducted that asked 50 survey respondents to guess the ages of the individuals in the study’s photographs. Values near the means of respondents’ answers were used (i.e. 34 and 62 years of age).

As a survey experiment, the intervention (i.e. the manipulated image and story details) and outcome measure are both administered to participants within the survey itself (Jilke and Van Ryzin 2017). The outcome or dependent variable severity of punishment is measured in this study with a single survey item that asks participants to indicate the appropriate harshness they would recommend to the city council responsible for taking disciplinary action against the rule breaking city manager. The item response is a 100-point scale, ranging from 1.0 (“least severe”) to 10.0 (“most severe”), using a horizontal slider. Given that city managers are appointed officials rather than elected ones, the relatively common measure of amount of punishment used in studies of political corruption – i.e. the likelihood a study participant will not vote for the accused incumbent (Welch and Hibbing 1997; Alatas et al. 2009; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2016; Bauhr and Charron 2018; Solaz et al. 2019) – is unhelpful and inappropriate.

The survey concludes with a series of items addressing sociodemographic and other background characteristics serving as control variables. These factors include age (0 = equal to or younger than the median age, 35 years, 1 = older than the median age), gender (0 = male, female = 1), racial minority status (0 = no, 1 = yes), political party identification (0 = no party affiliation, 1 = leaning or firmly Republican, 2 = leaning or firmly Democratic, 3 = third party, e.g., Green or Libertarian), and civic engagement, represented by participants’ previous attendance at a city or town council meeting (0 = no, 1 = yes, more than one year ago, 2 = yes, within the last year).

The data were collected with an online survey administered via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) online marketplace, an approach growing in public administration research (see Marvel, 2016; Jilke, Van Ryzin, & Van de Walle, 2016). Surveys were completed by a total of 950 respondents, all of whom were at least 18 years of age, living in the United States, and

earning better than a 95% MTurk approval rate. Consistent with customary practice, a series of three attention checks were strategically placed within the survey instrument to assist with detecting low-effort responses (Sheehan & Pittman, 2016). Observations with failed attention checks (n=42) were removed from the dataset, resulting in a final sample of 908 respondents. In all, the sample is 40% female (n = 366), 75% white, non-Hispanic (n = 685), and an average of 37 years of age. Roughly half the sample identify as Democrats and 31% reported previous attendance at a city or town council meeting. Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for the study sample and an analysis of key sociodemographic attributes across all conditions. Analysis shows no statistically significant differences across groups for any of these characteristics. Despite the diversity of the sample across these factors, it does remain a nonprobability, voluntary sample and we can make no claims of statistical representation of the US population as a whole. The following section reports the results of a series of group-means comparisons models (analysis of variance and *t*-test) and regression analysis.

Table 1. Sample Descriptives, Study 1

| | | Across all 18 groups | | | |
|---|-----------------------------|----------------------|-------|----------|------|
| | | χ^2 | Df | <i>p</i> | |
| Gender | Female | 40.0% | 19.27 | 17 | .313 |
| Race/Ethnicity | White, non-Hispanic | 75.4% | 13.89 | 17 | .675 |
| Age (<i>M</i> = 37.5) | 35 years and younger | 54.0% | 6.73 | 17 | .987 |
| Political Party Identification | No party affiliation | 19.2% | 45.63 | 51 | .686 |
| | Leaning or Firm Republican | 27.6% | | | |
| | Leaning or Firm Democratic | 49.7% | | | |
| | Third party | 3.5% | | | |
| City/Town Council Meeting Attendance | No, never | 69.1% | 32.96 | 34 | .519 |
| | Yes, more than one year ago | 21.6% | | | |
| | Yes, within the last year | 9.4% | | | |

Note: *n* = 908

Results of Study 1

Tables 2 and 3 present the group means of the *severity of punishment* recommended for the accused city managers across demographic profile groups within both motive conditions. Analysis of variance reveals no statistically significant differences across groups for average severity of punishment for neither the destructive motivation conditions, $F(8, 441) = .640, p = .747$, nor the prosocial motivation conditions, $F(8, 449) = 1.01, p = .682$. Among the destructive conditions, the mean severity value is 6.37 for the total subsample, with group means therein ranging from 5.85 (younger black man profile) to 6.76 (older white man profile). Among the prosocial conditions, the mean severity value is 5.34 for the subsample, with group means therein ranging from 4.81 (younger black man profile) to 5.85 (older white woman profile). Beyond the lack of group means differences between demographic profiles, it is interesting that the inclusion of a photograph and personal characteristics (i.e. age and first name) of the focal city managers did not significantly affect mean punishment scores in meaningful ways.

Table 2. Group Means, Destructive Motive for Violation

| Demographic-Motive Profile | <i>M</i> | <i>SD</i> | <i>n</i> |
|--------------------------------------|----------|-----------|----------|
| No photo or name – destructive | 6.39 | 2.51 | 51 |
| Older black man – destructive | 6.11 | 2.40 | 44 |
| Older black woman – destructive | 6.44 | 2.38 | 43 |
| Older white man – destructive | 6.38 | 2.56 | 60 |
| Older white woman – destructive | 6.76 | 2.39 | 57 |
| Younger black man – destructive | 5.85 | 2.36 | 49 |
| Younger black woman – destructive | 6.19 | 2.61 | 50 |
| Younger white man – destructive | 6.63 | 2.70 | 43 |
| Younger white woman – destructive | 6.54 | 2.46 | 53 |
| Total subsample – destructive motive | 6.37 | 2.48 | 450 |

Note: Dependent variable: *severity of punishment* (1.0 – 10.0 scale); ANOVA results, $F(8, 441) = .640, p = .747$, indicate no statistical group means differences.

Table 3. Group Means, Prosocial Motive for Violation

| Demographic-Motive Profile | <i>M</i> | <i>SD</i> | <i>n</i> |
|------------------------------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|
| No photo or name – prosocial | 5.77 | 2.33 | 59 |
| Older black man – prosocial | 4.93 | 2.94 | 49 |
| Older black woman – prosocial | 5.50 | 2.79 | 47 |
| Older white man – prosocial | 5.31 | 2.91 | 52 |
| Older white woman – prosocial | 5.85 | 2.45 | 57 |
| Younger black man – prosocial | 4.81 | 2.46 | 41 |
| Younger black woman – prosocial | 4.92 | 2.66 | 58 |
| Younger white man – prosocial | 5.36 | 2.66 | 53 |
| Younger white woman – prosocial | 5.42 | 2.88 | 42 |
| Total subsample – prosocial motive | 5.34 | 2.67 | 458 |

Note: Dependent variable: *severity of punishment* (1.0 – 10.0 scale); ANOVA results, $F(8, 449) = 1.01$, $p = .682$, indicate no statistical group means differences.

Table 4 presents the group means of the two motivation conditions for each of the eight demographic profiles. For all demographic profiles, statistically significant mean differences exist between the destructive and prosocial motivation conditions. The mean differences in moving from the destructive to prosocial condition are substantial as well, ranging from -.910 (older white woman profile) to -1.27 (younger black woman and younger white man). There is no statistical mean difference between the destructive and prosocial conditions for the profile presented without a photograph or personal characteristics (i.e. age, first name).

Table 4. Group Means, by Motive by Demographic Profile

| Demographic-Motive Profile | <i>M</i> | <i>Sig. Diff.</i> | <i>n</i> |
|----------------------------|----------|-------------------|----------|
| No photo or name | | | |
| Destructive | 6.39 | | 51 |
| Prosocial | 5.77 | | 59 |
| Older black man | | | |
| Destructive | 6.11 | | 44 |
| Prosocial | 4.93 | -1.18* | 49 |
| Older black woman | | | |
| Destructive | 6.44 | | 43 |
| Prosocial | 5.50 | -.940** | 47 |
| Older white man | | | |
| Destructive | 6.38 | | 60 |
| Prosocial | 5.31 | -1.07** | 52 |
| Older white woman | | | |
| Destructive | 6.76 | | 57 |
| Prosocial | 5.85 | -.910** | 57 |
| Younger black man | | | |
| Destructive | 5.85 | | 49 |
| Prosocial | 4.81 | -1.04** | 41 |
| Younger black woman | | | |
| Destructive | 6.19 | | 50 |
| Prosocial | 4.92 | -1.27** | 58 |
| Younger white man | | | |
| Destructive | 6.63 | | 43 |
| Prosocial | 5.36 | -1.27** | 53 |
| Younger white woman | | | |
| Destructive | 6.54 | | 53 |
| Prosocial | 5.42 | -1.12** | 42 |

Note: Dependent variable: *severity of punishment* (1.0 – 10.0 scale); *t*-tests:
 * = sig, $p < .10$, ** = sig, $p < .05$

Table 5 shows the group means of participants by demographic attribute (gender, race, and age) and the study's fictional city managers by the same demographic factors. Among the study's participants, men ($M = 6.11$) on average recommended significantly more severe penalties than women ($M = 5.47$), and racial minorities ($M = 6.21$) similarly meted out harsher punishments than whites ($M = 5.73$). There were no significant means differences for age among participants. Results indicate that, among the city manager profiles, white managers ($M = 6.04$)

were sanctioned more severely than their black counterparts ($M = 5.57$). However, there were no significant mean differences based on managers' gender or age.

Table 5. Group Means of Respondents and City Managers, by Demographic Factor

| | <i>M</i> | <i>Sig. Diff.</i> | <i>n</i> |
|-------------------------------------|----------|-------------------|----------|
| Participant, by Demographic | | | |
| Male | 6.11 | | 542 |
| Female | 5.47 | -.640** | 366 |
| White | 5.73 | | 685 |
| Minority | 6.21 | .480** | 223 |
| Younger | 5.88 | | 490 |
| Older | 5.82 | | 418 |
| City Manager, by Demographic | | | |
| Male | 5.68 | | 391 |
| Female | 5.95 | | 407 |
| White | 6.04 | | 417 |
| Black | 5.57 | -.470** | 381 |
| Younger | 5.71 | | 389 |
| Older | 5.92 | | 409 |

Note: Dependent variable: *severity of punishment* (1.0 – 10.0 scale);
t-tests: * = sig, $p < .10$, ** = sig, $p < .05$

Analysis of group means differences based on participant demographic factors of gender, race, and age for all city manager demographic-motive profiles was also conducted. Table 6 shows the results, restricted to only the statistically significant ($p < .05$) findings. Participant gender is relevant in four city manager demographic-motive profiles, with men on average recommending harsher penalties than women for (1) the older and younger white men with destructive motives; and (2) the older black man and younger black woman with prosocial motives for their rule violations. Participant race is relevant in three city manager profiles, with

minority participants handing down more severe punishments for (1) the younger black woman with destructive motives; and (2) the older black woman and younger white man with prosocial motives. Participant age was relevant for a single city manager profile, as older participants endorsed less severe punishment for the older black man with prosocial violation motives.

Table 6. Significant Group Means, by Participant Demographic Factors by City Manager Profile

| Demographic-Motive Profile, City Manager | Participant Group | <i>M</i> | <i>n</i> |
|---|--------------------------|----------|----------|
| Older white man – destructive | Male | 6.97 | 35 |
| | Female | 5.54 | 25 |
| Younger white man – destructive | Male | 7.71 | 20 |
| | Female | 5.70 | 23 |
| Older black man – prosocial | Male | 5.61 | 34 |
| | Female | 3.38 | 25 |
| Younger black woman – prosocial | Male | 5.50 | 35 |
| | Female | 4.03 | 23 |
| Younger black woman – destructive | White | 5.79 | 39 |
| | Minority | 7.60 | 21 |
| Older black woman – prosocial | White | 4.96 | 37 |
| | Minority | 7.46 | 20 |
| Younger white man – prosocial | White | 4.91 | 38 |
| | Minority | 6.51 | 25 |
| Older black man – prosocial | Younger | 5.78 | 26 |
| | Older | 3.96 | 23 |

Note: Dependent variable: *severity of punishment* (1.0 – 10.0 scale); * = sig, $p < .10$, ** = sig, $p < .05$; Data is restricted to statistically significant *t*-test results.

As a robustness check, we include regression models including pretreatment (i.e. trust in local government” and post-treatment covariates (e.g., participant demographic factors). Table 7 presents the results of this regression analysis. The severity of punishment recommended by our participants is first modeled as a function of the demographic factors and violation motive of the city manager to test for main effects (Model 1). Race and motive are significantly ($p < .05$) and

negatively associated with severity, with black city managers and city managers acting with prosocial motives receiving more lenient outcomes. City managers' age and gender did not exert significant influences on punishments. Model 2 introduces two-way interaction terms between city managers' demographic profiles: age x race, age x gender, and race x gender. As Table 7 shows, none of the interaction terms are significant; however, the associations with city managers' race and motive remain significant and negative in accord with first model. Model 3 expands Model 1, adding a set of covariate measures of participant demographic and other background factors. Findings indicate women participants levy less severe punishments than men, and trust in local government and third-party political affiliation similarly contribute to more lenient penalties. Race and civic engagement are likewise significantly associated with punishment severity, with racial minority participants and those reporting previous city council meeting attendance recommending harsher sentences.

Table 7. Regression Analysis

| Variable | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
|---|-----------------|-----------------|---|
| Older CM | .193 (.183) | -.092 (.314) | .196 (.182) |
| Black CM | -.441 (.184)** | -.599 (.326)* | -.481 (.182)** |
| Woman CM | .286 (.183) | .054 (.323) | .274 (.181) |
| Older CM x Black CM | | .216 (.369) | |
| Older CM x Woman CM | | .360 (.368) | |
| Black CM x Woman CM | | .105 (.369) | |
| Prosocial Motive CM | - 1.09 (.183)** | - 1.10 (.184)** | - 1.11 (.181)** |
| Trust in local gov't | | | -.204 (.109)* |
| Female | | | -.713 (.187)** |
| Minority | | | .421 (.219)* |
| Age | | | .001 (.008) |
| Political Party ID † Lean/Firm Republican Lean/Firm Democratic Third Party | | | .301 (.270) .147 (.241) - 1.25 (.575)** |
| Council Attendance ¥ Yes, more than one year ago Yes, in the last year | | | .570 (.231)** -.010 (.313) |
| | $r^2 = .054$ | $r^2 = .056$ | $r^2 = .095$ |
| | n = 798 | n = 798 | n = 798 |

Note: Dependent variable: *severity of punishment* (1.0 – 10.0 scale); * = sig, $p < .10$, ** = sig, $p < .05$; Coefficients are unstandardized. Standard errors in parentheses. † - No party affiliation is the omitted category. ¥ - “No, never attended” is the omitted category.

Study 2: Citizen Judgment of Corruption in City Hall

The second study uses a 2 x 2 x 2 between-subject survey experiment to investigate the effects of demographic attributes of age, race, and gender on citizen reaction to misbehaving city managers. Unlike Study 1, the misbehavior of interest is corruption rather than violations of administrative rules, the story is delivered via video (with audio) instead of written form, and the reaction examined is not in the severity of punishment recommended but participants' moral outrage expressed toward the focal actors.

Corruption and its influences on citizen behavior and attitudes are prevalent topics within political science research. It should be noted that corruption does not possess a universal understanding, with definitions and criteria varying across societies and cultures (Peters and Welch 1978; Johnston 1986; Melgar, Rossi, and Smith 2010). Local government in the U.S. supplies the contextual background for this study, a phenomenon turned caricature in popular culture with Tammany Hall in mid-19th century New York City and a political pathology that persists – and is perceived by citizens to persist – even now (Masters and Graycar 2015; Graycar and Villa 2011; Anechiarico 2005; Anechiarico and Jacobs 1996). Recent corruption studies find that women are less tolerant of corruption in particular countries and not others (Alatas et al. 2009); and that corrupt political climates can increase citizen loyalty to corrupt leaders and exacerbate ingroup-outgroup tensions (Bauhr and Charron 2018).

Studies of citizen punishment of political corruption often focus on electoral behavior, that is whether such events affect citizens' willingness to vote for the politician (de Sousa and Moriconi 2013; Solaz et al. 2019; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2016). However, the focal actors of this study are city managers, appointed bureaucrats for whom citizens can neither vote for or against. Thus, we focus on citizen reaction to local government corruption in terms of moral outrage – a reaction with dimensions argued to tap anger and disgust (Salerno and Peter-Hagene 2013), and that influences one's political intolerance (Skitka, Bauman, and Mullen 2004) and voting behavior (Okimoto and Brescoll 2010).


Procedure and Sample

Following a brief introduction to the survey, participants were randomly assigned to one of nine conditions. Participants were then asked questions related to their perceptions of local

government and their assessment of a fictional news story before providing their own socio-demographic attributes.

Participants were randomly assigned to one of nine possible groups (see Figure 2), including eight treatment groups and one control group. Participants in all groups viewed a fictional local news video segment roughly 90 seconds in length ($M = 86$ sec., $SD = 1.87$) video segment. The videos were recorded with a professional videographer using the news desk of a large public university in the southeastern U.S. and featured a news anchor with nearly 15 years of on-air experience in local news broadcasting. The news story details the alleged corruption of a city manager that included receipt of bribes and kickbacks from a private contractor in exchange for \$24 million in city business as well as the personal use of government credit cards totaling \$180,000. The experimental treatment or manipulation lies in the varied age-race-gender demographic profile of the city manager, which was communicated to respondents via photographs³ embedded in the local news segment as well as the details (i.e. name, specific age) delivered by the news anchor. Eight treatment groups were each presented with a unique photograph of an accused city manager with a particular profile of age (younger, 34, or older, 62), race (black or white), and gender (male or female, “John Williams” or “Patricia Williams”). A ninth group, the control, viewed a news segment with a generic photograph of “city hall” and excluded the accused’s first name, referring to the city manager only by last name (“Williams”), and age in order to present a focal actor free of the demographic attributes of interest.

³ Study 2 used the same photographs as Study 1.

Figure 2. Experimental design.

Prior to watching a news video, participants were asked two questions adapted from Kweit and Kweit (2007) to assess their general trust in local government coming in to the study (e.g., “How much of the time do you think you can trust the city government to do what is right?”). After watching their assigned news video, participants were asked questions related to their moral outrage toward the accused city manager. Moral outrage is measured as the average of participants’ level of agreement with three statements drawn from Salerno and Peter-Hagene (2013) – “I feel a compelling need to push Williams;” “I feel Williams is evil to the core;” and “I feel morally outraged by what Williams did” – on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely). The items are designed to tap into cognitive, affective, and behavioral dimensions (i.e. thinking, feeling, and acting) of moral outrage. Higher values on the scale ($\alpha = .837$) indicate more intense moral outrage expressed toward the offending city manager and their corrupt behavior.

The survey concludes with a series of items addressing sociodemographic and other background characteristics serving as control variables. These factors include age (0 = equal to

or younger than the median age, 36 years, 1 = older than the median age), gender (0 = male, female = 1), racial minority status (0 = no, 1 = yes), political party identification (0 = no party affiliation, 1 = leaning or firmly Republican, 2 = leaning or firmly Democratic, 3 = third party, e.g., Green or Libertarian), and civic engagement, represented by participants' previous attendance at a city or town council meeting (0 = no, 1 = yes, more than one year ago, 2 = yes, within the last year).

In the same approach as Study 1, the data were also collected with an online survey administered via Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) online marketplace. Surveys were completed by a total of 700 respondents, all of whom were at least 18 years of age, living in the United States, and earning better than a 98% MTurk approval rate. A pair of attention checks were strategically placed within the survey instrument to assist with detecting low-effort responses (Sheehan & Pittman, 2016). Observations with failed attention checks ($n = 43$) were removed from the dataset, resulting in a final sample of 657 respondents. In all, the sample is 42% female ($n = 273$), 76% white, non-Hispanic ($n = 496$), and an average of 39 years of age. Over half the sample identify as Democrats (56%) and 36% reported previous attendance at a city or town council meeting. Table 8 displays the descriptive statistics for the study sample and an analysis of key sociodemographic attributes across all experimental and control groups. Analysis shows no statistically significant differences across groups for gender, race/ethnicity, political party identification, or previous city or town council meeting attendance. However, it should be noted that, despite random assignment, a statistical difference ($p = .023$) does exist for age (as measured, 0 = equal to or younger than the median age, 1 = older than the median age) across the nine conditions. Despite the diversity of the sample across these factors, it does remain a nonprobability, voluntary sample and we can make no claims of statistical representation of the

US population as a whole. The following section reports the results of a series of group-means comparisons models (analysis of variance and *t*-test) and regression analysis.

Table 8. Sample Descriptives, Study 2 (Corruption)

| | | Across all 17 groups | | | |
|---|-----------------------------|----------------------|-------|----------|------|
| | | χ^2 | Df | <i>p</i> | |
| Gender | Female | 41.6% | 6.10 | 8 | .637 |
| Race/Ethnicity | White, non-Hispanic | 75.5% | 10.76 | 8 | .216 |
| Age (<i>M</i> = 38.8) | 36 years and younger | 52.4% | 17.73 | 8 | .023 |
| | Older than 36 years | 47.6% | | | |
| Political Party Identification | No party affiliation | 19.0% | 15.36 | 24 | .910 |
| | Leaning or Firm Republican | 22.5% | | | |
| | Leaning or Firm Democratic | 55.9% | | | |
| | Third party | 2.6% | | | |
| City/Town Council Meeting Attendance | No, never | 64.2% | 16.08 | 16 | .448 |
| | Yes, more than one year ago | 23.9% | | | |
| | Yes, within the last year | 11.9% | | | |

Note: *n* = 657

Results of Study 2

Table 9 presents the group mean scores of *moral outrage* across the city manager demographic profile groups. The total sample (*n* = 657) mean is 3.39, with group means ranging from 3.02 (older black woman) to 3.63 (older white man) for the eight profiles. Analysis of variance reveals few statistical group means differences, $F(8, 648) = 3.05$, $p = .002$: moral outrage was lower for the older black woman ($M = 3.02$) than for the older white man ($M = 3.63$) and the neutral profile (i.e. no photograph or first name; $M = 3.72$). Table 10 shows the group means of moral outrage for participants and city manager profiles, broken out by demographic

factors of gender (male, female), race (black, white), and age (younger, older). Analysis (t-tests, by group) indicates no significant ($p < .05$) group means differences based on any demographic factor for neither participants nor city managers.

Table 9. Means of Demographic Profile Groups

| Demographic Profile | <i>M</i> | <i>n</i> | <i>Sig. Diff.</i> |
|----------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|--------------------------|
| (a) Younger White Man | 3.24 | 75 | |
| (b) Younger White Woman | 3.23 | 82 | |
| (c) Younger Black Man | 3.46 | 68 | |
| (d) Younger Black Woman | 3.49 | 79 | |
| (e) Older White Man | 3.63 | 63 | (h) |
| (f) Older White Woman | 3.49 | 71 | |
| (g) Older Black Man | 3.24 | 83 | |
| (h) Older Black Woman | 3.02 | 64 | (e), (i) |
| (i) No Photo, First Name | 3.72 | 72 | (h) |
| Total Sample | 3.39 | 657 | |

ANOVA: $F(8, 648) = 3.05, p = .002$. Bonferroni post-hoc multiple-comparisons tests.

Table 10. Group Means of Respondents and City Managers, by Demographic Factor

| | <i>M</i> | <i>n</i> |
|-------------------------------------|----------|----------|
| Participant, by Demographic | | |
| Male | 3.41 | 384 |
| Female | 3.56 | 273 |
| White | 3.40 | 496 |
| Minority | 3.33 | 161 |
| Younger | 3.33 | 344 |
| Older | 3.48 | 313 |
| City Manager, by Demographic | | |
| Male | 3.38 | 289 |
| Female | 3.31 | 296 |
| White | 3.38 | 291 |
| Black | 3.31 | 294 |
| Younger | 3.35 | 304 |
| Older | 3.34 | 281 |

Note: Dep var: *moral outrage* (1–5 scale); No sig. *t*-tests, $p < .05$.

In multiple *t*-test analyses examining means differences in moral outrage scores between both city manager profiles (i.e. gender, race, and age jointly) and city manager demographic factors (i.e. gender, race, and age independently) by participant demographic factors, few significant ($p < .05$) differences were discovered and are as follows:


- (a) men participants ($M = 3.23$) express more moral outrage than women ($M = 2.69$) toward the older black woman city manager;
- (b) younger participants ($M = 2.96$) are less outraged by the older black man city manager than older participants ($M = 3.53$);
- (c) white participants ($M = 3.45$) report more moral outrage than minority participants ($M = 3.14$) toward men city managers; and
- (d) older participants ($M = 3.44$) are more outraged by black city managers than younger participants ($M = 3.18$).

As a robustness check, we include regression models including pretreatment (i.e. trust in local government” and post-treatment covariates (e.g., participant demographic factors). Table 11 presents the results of this regression analysis. Moral outrage is first modeled as a function of the demographic factors of the city manager, including both the main effects of age, race, and gender and all two-way interactions (Model 1). The model indicates a significant ($p < .05$) main effect for age – with older city managers evoking higher levels of moral outrage – and interaction effect between age and race. Model 2 expands the first, including demographic and background characteristics of participants. In addition to the main effect of city manager age and the interaction between city manager age and race revealed in Model 1, findings of the second model indicate moral outrage is significantly influenced by participants’ trust in local government, gender, political party identification, and civic engagement. Participants reporting higher levels of trust, affiliation with a major political party (i.e. Republican or Democrat), and recent attendance at a city council meeting experience greater levels of moral outrage. Women participants expressed less intense moral outrage than men. Participant race, age, and education were not significant predictors in the model. To understand the substantive significance, Figure 3 shows the plotted values of the interaction effect between city manager race and age, which suggests that white and black city managers are judged differently based upon their ages.

Table 11. Regression Analysis

| Variable | Model 1 | Model 2 |
|---|-----------------|-----------------|
| Older CM | .421 (.157)** | .347 (.153)** |
| Black CM | .246 (.155) | .230 (.148) |
| Woman CM | .015 (.150) | .008 (.144) |
| Older CM x Black CM | - .666 (.178)** | - .552 (.172)** |
| Older CM x Woman CM | - .189 (.178) | - .138 (.172) |
| Black CM x Woman CM | - .016 (.178) | - .076 (.171) |
| Trust in local gov't | | .108 (.050)** |
| Female | | - .159 (.088)* |
| Minority | | - .014 (.103) |
| Age | | .003 (.004) |
| Education Bachelors degree or higher | | - .081 (.087) |
| Political Party ID † | | |
| Lean/Firm Republican | | .761 (.135)** |
| Lean/Firm Democratic | | .232 (.113)** |
| Third Party | | .039 (.283) |
| Council Attendance ¥ | | |
| Yes, more than one year ago | | .167 (.106) |
| Yes, in the last year | | .440 (.137)** |
| | $r^2 = .027$ | $r^2 = .130$ |
| | n = 585 | n = 585 |

Note: Dependent variable: *moral outrage* (1 – 5 scale); * = sig, $p < .10$, ** = sig, $p < .05$; Coefficients are unstandardized. Standard errors in parentheses. † - No party affiliation is the omitted category. ¥ - “No, never attended” is the omitted category.

Figure 3. Interaction Plot, Older x Black Predictive Margins

Note: n = 585

General Discussion and Conclusion

This research examines the influences that sociodemographic factors of age, race, and gender have on citizen reactions to local government managers accused of misbehavior, both administrative policy violations and the more egregious, indeed illegal, corruption. Given the evidence from related studies in contexts such as elections and workplaces that examine implicit biases and demographic-centered stereotypes (e.g., Gill and Eugenis 2019; Sanbonmatsu 2002; Dolan and Sanbonmatsu 2008; Chiu et al. 2001; McDermott 1998), group identities and ingroup-outgroup dynamics (e.g., Bauhr and Charron 2018; Solaz et al. 2019), and symbolic representation (e.g., Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006; Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Li 2016;

Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Lavena 2014), it is reasonable to expect that in the two experiments presented here that the demographic profiles of the wayward city managers, the participants, or both would drive differences in the severity of punishment and intensity of moral outrage cast toward the accused.

In Study 1, our analysis of the effects of demographic characteristics – clustered in profiles and in isolation – provided relative weak support for ingroup-outgroup dynamics wherein participants would consistently punish city managers with whom they have no shared identities. Results indicate a significant main effect for race, with white city managers incurring more intense punishments than their black counterparts, a surprising finding given previous studies such as those in electoral politics pointing toward a race penalty for African American politicians (Berinsky, Hutchings, Mendelberg, Shaker, and Valentino 2011; Sigelman, Sigelman, Walkosz, and Nitz 1995; Terkildsen 1993). When controlling for the underlying motivation driving the city manager’s violations (i.e. prosocial, other-focused versus destructive, self-interested), analysis finds no meaningful group differences in the severity of punishments handed down across the eight age-race-gender profiles. When participant demographics are considered independently, findings are rather scattered: men recommended harsher penalties in four of 18 conditions, of which three were men city managers; and racial minority participants also levied heavier punishments in four conditions, three of which were black city managers.⁴

Overall, the first study makes a strong case that motive matters. When citizens are interpreting and evaluating information regarding government officials’ violations of policies or administrative rules – behavior likely unethical yet not criminal – the reason or rationale behind

⁴ We do not intend to suggest that the racial minority population is homogenous such that attitudes toward African Americans would be necessarily equivalent or substantially similar between African Americans, Latinos, Native Americans, or other racial minority groups.

noncompliance appears to influence resultant judgments of the rule breakers. For every age-race-gender city manager profile, the group mean punishment scores were significantly lower for the prosocial conditions than the destructive, self-interested conditions, suggesting this buffering effect is not reserved for or limited to city managers of particular demographic profiles.

Overall, the results of Study 2 offer some evidence that demographic characteristics influence citizen judgment of corrupt officials. When examining the effects of age, race, and gender of both focal city managers and participants in isolation, the results are scattered and inconsistent: men and woman participants do not express moral outrage differently based on the city managers' age, race, or gender; white and minority participants diverge only in judgment of men city managers (with white respondents more morally outraged); and younger and older participants express significantly different outrage toward only black city managers (with older respondents more outraged). When examining age, race, and gender jointly within city manager profiles, both men and women participants and younger and older participants differ significantly in their reported moral outrage for a single profile, the older black woman and older black man, respectively. White and minority participants' levels of moral outrage for all profiles were statistically indistinguishable.

Regression results in Study 2 indicate a significant main effect of age, with older city managers subject to more intense moral outrage than younger city managers. This finding may appear intuitive, congruent with the notion that older individuals are more experienced and “should know better” – and are thus more culpable – while younger individuals perhaps deserve the benefit of the doubt or are otherwise less worthy of disgust or anger directed their way. However, results indicate that age interacts with race, thus we cannot talk about age without also discussing race. The plotted values of this interaction (in Figure 3) show that, when young, black

city managers engaged in corruption provoke greater moral outrage overall than do white city managers. Yet, when older, these positions are reversed, with corrupt white managers drawing more outrage in citizen judgment than corrupt black managers.

In all, the results of the two studies find that demographic factors are important in terms of citizen judgment of misbehavior – unethical and illegal – committed by local government officials. Race matters, but in unexpected ways. Contrary to substantial evidence from workplace and electoral studies, black city managers who break administrative rules receive more lenient punishments than white managers. More, at the intersection of age and race, older black city managers engaging in corruption incite less moral outrage than their older white managers. Beyond demographic factors, we are equally interested in whether the motives behind unethical behavior are consequential for explaining citizen judgment. The evidence presented shows a compelling case for significant role motive plays, irrespective of the focal actor's demographic profile.

References

- Abrams, D., Swift, H. J., & Drury, L. (2016). Old and unemployable? How age-based stereotypes affect willingness to hire job candidates. *Journal of Social Issues, 72*(1), 105-121.
- Alkadry, M. G., & Tower, L. E. (2011). Covert pay discrimination: How authority predicts pay differences between women and men. *Public Administration Review, 71*(5), 740-750.
- Alatas, V., Cameron, L., Chaudhuri, A., Erkal, N., & Gangadharan, L. (2009). Gender, culture, and corruption. *Southern Economic Journal, 75*(3), 663-680.
- Anechiarico, F. (2005). The cure for a public disease: The foibles and future of corruption control. In H. G. Frederickson & R. K. Ghere (Eds.), *Ethics in public management* (pp. 243–258). Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- Anechiarico, F., & Jacobs, J. B. (1996). *The pursuit of absolute integrity: How corruption control makes government ineffective*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Bearfield, D. A. (2009). Equity at the intersection: Public administration and the study of gender. *Public Administration Review, 69*(3), 383-386.
- Berinsky, A. J., Hutchings, V. L., Mendelberg, T., Shaker, L., & Valentino, N. A. (2011). Sex and race: Are black candidates more likely to be disadvantaged by sex scandals? *Political Behavior, 33*, 179-202.
- Chiu, W. C. K., Chan, A. W., Snape, E., & Redman, T. (2001). Age stereotypes and discriminatory attitudes toward older workers: An East-West comparison. *Human Relations, 54*(5), 629-661.
- Christensen, R. K., Szmer, J., & Stritch, J. M. (2012). Race and gender bias in three administrative contexts: Impact on work assignments in state supreme courts. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 22*(4), 625-648.
- Clapham, M. M., Johnson, M. C., & Ambrose, K. G. (2016). The age factor in gender stereotyping of leaders. *ASBBS Proceedings, 23*(1), 120-126.
- Crenshaw, K. W. (1994). Mapping the margins: Intersectionality, identity politics, and violence against women of color. In M. Albertson Fineman & R. Mykitiuk (Eds.), *The Public Nature of Private Violence* (93-118). New York, NY: Routledge.
- de Sousa, L., & Moriconi, M. (2013). Why votes do not throw the rascals out?—A conceptual framework for analyzing electoral punishment of corruption. *Crime, Law, and Social Change, 60*(5), 471-502.
- Dolan, K., & Sanbonmatsu, K. (2008). Gender stereotypes and attitudes toward gender balance

- in government. *American Politics Research*, 37(3), 409-428.
- Fernandez, S., Malatesta, D., & Smith, C. R. (2012). Race, gender, and government contracting: Different explanations or new prospects for theory? *Public Administration Review*, 73(1), 109-120.
- Gill, R. D., & Eugenis, K. (2019). Do voters prefer women judges? Deconstructing the competitive advantage in state supreme court elections. *State Politics & Policy Quarterly*, DOI: 10.1177/1532440019847771.
- Glover, S. H., Bumpus, M. A., Logan, J. E., Ciesla, J. R. (1997). Reexamining the influence of individual values on ethical decision-making. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 16, 1319-1329.
- Gooden, S. (2017). Social equity and evidence: Insights from local government. *Public Administration Review*, 77(6), 822-828.
- Graycar, A., & Villa, D. (2011). The loss of governance capacity through corruption. *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions*, 24(3), 419-438.
- Grissom, J. A., Nicholson-Crotty, J., & Nicholson-Crotty, S. (2009). Race, region, and representative bureaucracy. *Public Administration Review*, 69(5), 911-919.
- Guy, M. E., & McCandless, S. A. (2012). Social equity: Its legacy, is promise. *Public Administration Review*, 72(S1), S5-S13.
- Hale, M. (1999). He says, she says: Gender and worklife. *Public Administration Review*, 59(5), 410-424.
- Jilke, S. R., & Van Ryzin, G. G. (2017). Survey experiments for public management research. In O. James, S. R. Jilke, & G. G. Van Ryzin (Eds.), *Experiments in Public Management Research: Challenges and Contributions* (117-138). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Jilke, S. R., Van Ryzin, G. G., & Van de Walle, S. (2016). Responses to decline in marketized public services: An experimental evaluation of choice overload. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 26(3), 421-432.
- Johnson, S. K., Murphy, S. E., Zewdie, S., & Reichard, R. J. (2008). The strong, sensitive type: Effects of gender stereotypes and leadership prototypes on the evaluation of male and female leaders. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 106(1), 39-60.
- Johnston, M. (1986). Right & wrong in American politics: Popular conceptions of corruption. *Polity*, 18(3), 367-391.
- Keiser, L. R., Wilkins, V. M., Meier, K. J., & Holland, C. A. (2002). Lipstick and logarithms:

- Gender, institutional context, and representative bureaucracy. *American Political Science Review*, 96(3), 553-564.
- Marvel, J. D. (2016). Unconscious bias in citizens' evaluations of public sector performance. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 26(3), 143-158.
- Masters, A. B., & Graycar, A. (2015). Making corruption disappear in local government. *Public Integrity*, 18, 42-58.
- McDermott, M. L. (1998). Race and gender cues in low-information elections. *Political Research Quarterly*, 51(4), 895-918.
- Meier, K. J. (1975). Representative bureaucracy: An empirical analysis. *American Political Science Review*, 69(2), 526-542.
- Meier, K. J., & Wilkins, V. M. (2002). Gender differences in agency head salaries: The case of public education. *Public Administration Review*, 62(4), 405-411.
- Meier, K. J., & Nicholson-Crotty, J. (2006). Gender, representative bureaucracy, and law enforcement: The case of sexual assault. *Public Administration Review*, 66, 850-860.
- Melgar, N., Rossi, M., Smith, T. W. (2010). The perception of corruption. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 22(1), 120-131.
- Meon, P., & Sekkat, K. (2005). Does corruption grease or sand the wheels of growth? *Public Choice*, 122, 69-97.
- Mo, P. (2001). Corruption and economic growth. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 29, 66-79.
- Morrison, E. W. (2006). Doing the job well: An investigation of pro-social rule breaking. *Journal of Management*, 32(1), 5-28.
- Ng, T. W. H., & Feldman, D. C. (2012). Evaluating six common stereotypes about older workers with meta-analytical data. *Personnel Psychology*, 65(4), 821-858.
- Okimoto, T. G., & Brescoll, V. L. (2010). The price of power: Power seeking and backlash against female politicians. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 36, 923-936.
- Ortega, R., Plagens, G. K., Stephens, P., & Berry-James, R. M. (2012). Mexican American public sector professionals: Perceptions of affirmative action policies and workplace discrimination. *Review of Public Personnel Administration*, 32(1), 24-44.
- Park, H., & Blenkinsopp, J. (2011). The roles of transparency and trust in the relationship between corruption and citizen satisfaction. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 77(2), 254-274.

- Peters, J. G., & Welch, S. (1978). Political corruption in America: A search for definitions and a theory, or If political corruption is in the mainstream of American politics why is it not in the mainstream of American politics research? *The American Political Science Review*, 72(3), 974-984.
- Portillo, S. (2008). *The face of the state: The role of social status and official position in the mobilization of authority* (Ph.D. dissertation). University of Kansas: Lawrence, KS.
- Posthuma, R. A., & Campion, M. A. (2009). Age stereotypes in the workplace: Common stereotypes, moderators, and future research directions. *Journal of Management*, 35(1), 158-188.
- Reiss, M. C., & Mitra, K. (1998). The effects of individual difference factors on acceptability of ethical and unethical workplace behaviors. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 17, 1581-1593.
- Riccucci, N., & Saldivar, K. (2014). The status of employment discrimination suits in police and fire departments across the United States. *Review of Public Personnel Administration*, 34(3), 263-288.
- Riccucci, N. M., Van Ryzin, G. G., & Lavena, C. F. (2014). Representative bureaucracy in policing: Does it increase perceived legitimacy? *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 24, 537-551.
- Riccucci, N. M., Van Ryzin, G. G., & Li, H. (2016). Representative bureaucracy and the willingness to coproduce: An experimental study. *Public Administrative Review*, 76(1), 121-130.
- Rink, F., Ryan, M. K., & Stoker, J. I. (2013). Social resources at a time of crisis: How gender stereotypes inform gendered leader evaluations. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 43(5), 381-392.
- Salerno, J. M., & Peter-Hagene, L. C. (2013). The interactive effect of anger and disgust on moral outrage and judgments. *Psychological Science*, 24(10), 2069-2078.
- Sanbonmatsu, K. (2002). Gender stereotypes and vote choice. *American Journal of Political Science*, 46(1), 20-34.
- Scavo, C. (2008). Town and gown. In C. Newell (Ed.), *Managing Local Government: Cases in Decision Making* (39-46). Washington, DC: International City/County Management Association.
- Sheehan, K. B., & Pittman, M. (2016). *Amazon's Mechanical Turk for academics: The HIT handbook for social science research*. Irvine, CA: Melvin & Leigh, Publishers.
- Sigelman, C. K., Sigelman, L., Walkosz, B. J., & Nitz, M. (1995). Black candidates, white

- voters: Understanding racial bias in political perceptions. *American Journal of Political Science*, 39, 243–265.
- Skitka, L. J., Bauman, C. J., & Mullen, E. (2004). Political tolerance and coming to psychological closure following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks: An integrative approach. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 30, 743–756.
- Stivers, C. (2002). *Gender images in public administration: Legitimacy and the administrative state*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Swamy, A., Knack, S., Lee, Y., Azfar, O. (2001). Gender and corruption. *Journal of Development Economics*, 64, 25-55.
- Terkildsen, N. (1993). When white voters evaluate black candidates: The processing implications of candidate skin color, prejudice, and self-monitoring. *American Journal of Political Science*, 37, 1032–1053
- Wilson, G. (2006). The rise of at-will employment and racial inequality in the public sector. *Review of Public Personnel Administration*, 26(2), 178-187.

Appendix A. Study 1 News Article Scripts.

Prosocial Violation Script

PARK GROVE – The city manager of Park Grove was placed on administrative leave Thursday, accused of intentionally violating procedural rules and undermining a city council vote, according to multiple news reports.

Park Grove City Manager [John or Patricia Williams], [34 or 62], approved an exemption to one of the most restrictive zoning codes in the city, paving the way for the controversial sale of a property at Elm and Third streets to Park Grove College. The property, an office building owned by Sheppard & Sons, LLC and located where the county hospital once stood, has sat vacant for nearly six years and fallen into disrepair.

Without an exemption, current zoning regulations would prohibit Park Grove College from using the property at 3120 Elm Street for offices or dormitories. The strict regulations stem from a history of poor neighborhood-college relations, largely a result of the college’s expansion into the historic Riverside District.

Last month, the city council voted 6-3 to deny Grove Park College a zoning exemption for the property, which college administrators say would be razed to build a new fundraising office.

Despite the city council’s opposition, City Manager Williams broke council procedural rules and approved the zoning exemption, which was followed quickly by the sale and transfer of the property to Park Grove College late last week. Construction will begin at the end of the month, WNTN-TV reported.

The City Manager claimed [his or her] decision was neither deceitful nor underhanded. “Listen, this property is an eyesore,” Williams said. “I firmly believe the best thing for Park Grove and our citizens is to allow the college to build and maintain a beautiful new building that adds to, not detracts from, our downtown. I want to do what is in the best interest for our city and residents.” Although not illegal, Williams’ decision stirred frustration.

The City Council will meet in closed chambers for a special session on Tuesday, October 2 to vote on the future of Williams.

Destructive Violation Script

PARK GROVE – The city manager of Park Grove was placed on administrative leave Thursday, accused of intentionally violating procedural rules, undermining a city council vote, and failing to disclose a conflict of interest, according to multiple news reports.

Park Grove City Manager [John or Patricia Williams], [34 or 62], approved an exemption to one of the most restrictive zoning codes in the city, paving the way for the controversial sale of a property at Elm and Third streets to Park Grove College. The property, an office building owned

by Sheppard & Sons, LLC located where the county hospital once stood, has sat vacant for nearly six years and fallen into disrepair.

Without an exemption, current zoning regulations would prohibit Park Grove College from using the property at 3120 Elm Street for offices or dormitories. The strict regulations stem from a history of poor neighborhood-college relations spurred by the college's expansion into the historic Riverside District.

Last month, the city council voted 6-3 to deny Grove Park College a zoning exemption for the property, which college administrators say would be razed to build a new fundraising office. Williams' sister-in-law, Ellen Hackman, is the chair of the Park Grove College advancement committee, which advises college leadership on all fundraising and alumni relations activities.

Despite the city council's opposition, City Manager Williams broke council procedural rules and approved the zoning exemption, which was followed quickly by the sale and transfer of the property to Park Grove College late last week. Construction will begin at the end of the month, WNTN-TV reported.

A series of email exchanges between Williams and Hackman were discovered that "make it look like [the exemption] was a personal favor," said a source with the city council's office. Williams claims [his or her] actions were not influenced by [his or her] family ties with Hackman. "I broke no laws with this exemption," said Williams. Although not illegal, Williams' decision stirred frustration.

The City Council will meet in closed chambers for a special session on Tuesday, October 2 to vote on the future of Williams.